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Coal And Conservation-Tax Policy
By FREDERICK W. WHITESIDE, JR.* and JOHN S. GILUG**
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy tax policy as applied to coal raises complicated
issues. We must ask: A. What are the goals for energy produc-
tion and consumption in the United States? B. What are the
goals for environment in relation to these energy goals? C.
What is the proper role of taxation in the resolution of these
questions?
A. National Goals For Energy Production
An abundant supply of energy has long been viewed as
essential for a prosperous and expanding economy, and energy
needs have in fact increased with economic growth and higher
standards of living. An abundant, cheap supply of energy for
heating, electric power, and transportation has made this in-
dustrial growth possible. With this growth and prosperity came
the economy of abundance, including waste and conspicuous
consumption. Summer or winter, cheap fuel enabled the Amer-
ican consumer to drive in his climate-controlled automobile
from home to office or club (likewise climate-controlled). The
prevailing energy policy was to live it up by drawing from the
ground a supposedly inexhaustible supply of oil and gas. Since
World War II the excess of consumption over domestic produc-
tion of oil has accelerated, however, and as early as 1960, there
were warnings of potential dangers-too rapid an exhaustion of
petroleum supplies and a dependence upon foreign oil.' The
increased aggressiveness of OPEC,' the oil embargo, and a five-
fold increase in the price of imported oil from 1973 to 1975,
made the public aware of an "energy crisis." In response, Presi-
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B., 1933, University of Arkansas;
LL.B., 1936, Cornell. William Shraberg, J.D., 1971, University of Kentucky, now with
the Tax Division of the Dept. of Justice contributed many valuable ideas.
** J.D., 1975, University of Kentucky, Clerk, Supreme Court of Kentucky.
I See statements of coal spokesman in 2 COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING
THE TAX BASE, H.R. 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1041 (1959), A report submitted to the
Committee on Ways and Means. [hereinafter cited as 2 COMPENDIUM].
2 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
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dent Nixon announced Project Independence in 1973, and in
late 1975 President Ford called on Congress for a national en-
ergy program.
Independence from foreign energy supplies calls for mas-
sive research in the development of other energy sources, nu-
clear, geothermal, and solar, and greater use of abundant coal
reserves. The part to be played by coal as the chief alternative
source of energy in this project has long been recognized. The
total fossil mineral energy reserves in the United States are
approximately 98 percent coal and 2 percent oil and gas.
Hence, as early as 1959, coal industry spokesmen informed the
Ways and Means Committee that future energy must come
largely from coal reserves because of "the approaching exhaus-
tion and ensuing higher prices of our petroleum and natural gas
supplies. ' '3 President Ford has also pointed out the need to
utilize coal, our most abundant fuel and energy resource, more
fully.' The most recent statement of energy goals has called for
a doubling of coal production in 10 years. The huge capital
investment required to finance this goal creates a financing
problem which can be aided, but not wholly solved, by a favor-
able tax climate.'
Supra note 1, at 1050. Estimates vary widely, both as to the extent of known
reserves, and their accessibility for extraction without unreasonable damage to the
surface land and streams. One source states: "The U.S. holds 437 billion tons of known
reserves. That is. . .enough energy to keep 100 million large electric generating plants
going for the next 800 years or so. It's 10 times as much energy as is contained in Saudi
Arabia's oil and 2.6 times as much as is available from the entire world's known oil
supply." FORBES, Dec. 15, 1975, at 28. See also 2 COMPENDIUM 6041-1059. The U.S.
Geological Survey estimates the nation's coal resources at 3.2 trillion tons. Of this
total, about 150 billion tons of recoverable coal are presently known in formations of
comparable thickness and depth to those being mined by present technology. Maxi-
mum projected production in the next 15 years would use less than 10 percent of the
150 billion tons. This modest utilization of total cost reserves included the output of
coal for making synthetic fuels.
Potential production of coal in 1985 was projected to range from 1,570 million tons
to 1,004 million tons, depending upon the projected growth rate in conventional use.
NATURAL RESOURCES, PANEL DISCUSSION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
H.R. 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. part 9, at 1284 (1973).
Ky. Coal Journal, Dec. 1975, at 9, col. 3.
See FORBES, Dec. 15, 1975, at 28.
The tax climate desired by the coal industry was outlined in a paper for the
House Ways and Means Committee by Rolla D. Campbell, of the Island Creek Coal
Company. See 2 COMPENDIUM 1041. See also statement of E. B. Leisenring, Tax Com-
mittee, National Coal Ass'n, in PANEL DISCUSSION BEFORE THE WAYS AND MEANS COM-
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Along with continued growth in production and consump-
tion, small but increasingly vocal forces have called for conser-
vation. Some commentators say, for example, that standards
of living cannot continue to rise forever, agreeing with former
Secretary of Interior Udall, who has stated that growth based
on rapid exhaustion of supply cannot continue. Today many of
the same business interests which formerly urged the consumer
toward ever-increasing consumption now advertise the necess-
ity of conserving all forms of energy-"[c]oal and conserva-
tion" is the slogan.
7
B. Goals For the Environment
The goal for the environment is to produce the needed
energy without unnecessary environmental sacrifice. Industry
promoters point out that coal can be mined and the earth res-
tored to a condition at least as good as before mining, and that
it can be burned without harmful air pollution.' The recent
dramatic increase in coal production has accentuated environ-
mental problems, however. Controls to reduce environmental
damage are unquestionably expensive, and additional capital
is required. Necessary environmental protection may be ac-
complished only at the expense of some energy production and
conversely, top energy production is likely to be at the expense
of some environmental damage. These are the necessary trade-
offs, for neither the announced energy goals nor rigid environ-
mental control can be had without some sacrifice of other val-
ues.' In fact, some economists view achievement of the environ-
mentalists' goals as inconsistent with adequate energy, at least
in the short run.'0
The tardiness of government intervention has further com-
plicated the problem. Had government regulation of land recla-
mation and water and air pollution come 20 years earlier, more
MIT EE, H.R. 99th Cong. 1st Sess. part 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 PANEL
DISCUSSION].
Advertisement of American Electric Power Co., Inc., in TIME, Nov. 3, 1975, at
81.
SId.
G. BRANNON, ENERGY TAXES AND SUBSIDIES 10, 47 (1974).
" Griffen, Environmental Quality and Rising Energy Needs, STUDIES IN ENERGY
TAX POLICY 253, 266. (G. Brannon ed., 1974).
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might have been accomplished with less waste of needed en-
ergy production. Instead, when action finally came, many of
the pollution control devices required by regulatory agencies
proved inadequate and new starts had to be made. This prob-
lem has been further compounded since 1974 by the unantici-
pated "energy crisis" and the national goal of independence
from foreign energy supplies.
Recognizing the tremendous capital expenditure required
for "more energy and a cleaner environment," Treasury Secre-
tary Simon recently directed attention to the spiralling need of
additional capital investment." The increased activity, with its
accompanying need of more machinery and equipment, is not
the only reason for additional money. Inflation has tripled the
cost of replacing depreciated equipment, so that reserves based
upon original cost are inadequate. High interest rates, com-
bined with greater need to borrow, has caused the interest cost
of return to capital to rise from 10 to 30 percent.'2 Increased
debt leaves any business such as coal mining vulnerable to
economic downswings and crumbling price levels, risks which
inhibit new investment. These economic facts must be consid-
ered in relation to harnessing resources for energy while pro-
tecting the environment.
C. Role of Taxation
In the area of federal income tax a rapidly growing number
of reformers urge a return to the principle that the purpose of
taxation should be primarily the raising of revenue. They advo-
cate the elimination of the complexities and inequities which
have multiplied as the federal income tax machinery has been
used increasingly as a tool to accomplish nonrevenue objec-
tives. This point of view has recently been articulated by an
increasing number of the nation's statesmen and scholars.'3
NATIONAL OBSERVER, Jan. 17, 1976, at 1, 15.
,2 Public Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Tax Reform, H.R.
94th Cong., 1st Sess. part 1 at 26 (Statement of Secretary Simon) (1975) [hereinafter
1975 Public Hearings].
,1 A few highlights are these:
1) In 1959 the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives
published a massive compilation of ideas and suggestions by tax experts on income
tax revision, PANEL DISCUSSION, BEFORE THE COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R.,
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Despite this concept of a simple and efficient tax system
designed solely to collect revenue, however, taxation is in fact
widely used for regulation. Taxes are levied to give the econ-
omy a shot in the arm or to put on the brakes, to encourage
activity deemed desirable, to encourage the use of some re-
sources, and to discourage others. Nowhere is this more true
than in the energy industry, where taxation has been used to
allocate resources by influencing prices and investment deci-
sions. Likewise, no area of tax policy has been more controver-
sial than that affecting the oil, gas and coal industries.
86th Cong., 1st Sess., (1959), together with a three volume COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON
BROADENING THE TAX BASE, supra note 1 for volume 2.
2) A running debate appeared in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW, in which four leading
legal and economic scholars presented divergent views on the feasibility and extent of
a truly "comprehensive tax base" for income tax. These views were later reprinted in
a monograph. B. BITTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE AND S. PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE
INCOME TAX BASE? A DEBATE (1968).
3) Many government officials have taken a stand in favor of radical simplifica-
tion of the tax structure. They advocate elimination of all differentials and incentives
favoring particular activities and groups of taxpayers to allow the income tax to serve
its primary function, the collection of revenue more efficiently. Secretary of the Treas-
ury Simon considers that the efficacy of the voluntary compliance system depends
upon the income tax system being perceived by the public as based upon "principles
of equity, simplicity and efficiency. And I think the American people perceive that it
is not a fair system, and God knows it's not a simple system." He further deplores the
tendency of politicians to try to overcome existing inequities in the tax structure by
"letting new groups in on the loopholes." NATIONAL OBSERVER, Jan. 17, 1976, at 1, 15.
A recent statement by Charles M. Walker, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy is in point. He spoke of the goals of fairness, efficiency and simplicity, in the
light of which proposals for broadening the tax base should be examined. 6 P-H 1976
FED. TAXES, Rep. Bull. 10 at 60, 115.
4) In 1973 Stanley S. Surrey authored PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973), urging
elimination of government subsidies for particular interests and groups taking the form
of tax relief and constituting a barrier to an equitable tax system. Provisions affording
special relief to certain taxpayers or industries are described as "tax expenditures"
costing the public the same as direct subsidy or welfare payments. See NEW YORK
TIMS SUNDAY MAGAZINE, April 13, 1975, at 50-63. He states that the proponents of
special tax incentives frame their arguments in terms of "assistance for this or that
industry or activity or hardship," not in terms of proper tax structure or tax equity.
On tax expenditures generally he argues, "When a Congressman votes a $1,000 tax
deduction, he's voting to give $700 to the rich man, $140 to a low wage worker, and
nothing to the poor."
5) Congress enacted the "Budget Reform Act of 1974" requiring for the first time
disclosure of amounts in the budget being spent as part of the tax system through
special tax relief. This relief is in reality financed by the taxpaying public. See SPECIAl.
ANALYSES; BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1976, (Special
Analysis F).
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Evaluation of existing or proposed tax policies affecting
coal raises more problems than answers. First, the variety of
taxes is great, each with underlying policy considerations to be
viewed separately and as part of the total tax system. No doubt
federal and state'4 income taxation play the primary role, but
state property and severance taxes must also be taken into
consideration. Second, a complete treatment would require
comparison of taxes on coal not only with oil and gas but also
with other industries. Third, it is extremely difficult to mea-
sure the economic impact of most taxes. Many tax measures
have been justified as providing incentives or deterrents to cer-
tain activity, yet experts differ widely in assessing the degree
of burdens or benefits achieved by any given tax provision. In
addition, the determination of who bears the burdens and who
enjoys the benefits is primarily speculation.
II. COAL AND FEDERAL TAXES
Three main aspects of the federal income tax and the in-
terrelationships between them are vital to understanding the
impact of taxes on the coal industry: (1) The availability of
capital gain treatment for profits, especially royalties under
coal leases provided under certain conditions by § 631(c) for
landowners and investors; (2) percentage depletion allowed an
operator on his high gross income from extraction plus certain
treatment processes; and (3) the tax treatment of expenditures
and depreciation, particularly the taxpayer's option to expense
exploration and development costs currently and to elect a fast
write-off for certain investments. These aspects will be dis-
cussed separately.
A. Capital Gain
Where the value of a business enterprise has increased, the
owner is sometimes afforded the opportunity to sell the busi-
ness and have the profit taxed at more favorable capital gain
rates. If the business is incorporated, the owners may be able
to achieve this result either by selling the corporate stock or by
1 In general, state income taxes are patterned after and correspond with the
federal law although with much lower rates.
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liquidating the corporation.'5 Producers of natural resources,
however, ordinarily have greater opportunity for sales with fa-
vorable capital gain treatment than do manufacturers or most
other entrepreneurs. Quite frequently a mining firm will de-
velop a lease to the producing stage, deduct expenditures for
development from ordinary income, and then sell the entire
operation with the profit taxed as capital gain.'" Although ordi-
nary income would have been realized by continuing the
operation for only a short time, the sale converts the work
product into capital gain. This kind of opportunity is open to
the developer of any mineral property, including coal.
Coal owners or holders of leasehold interests, however,
have available yet another very special statutory provision
which provides the equivalent of the long-term capital gain tax
advantage for a situation not even resembling a sale or liquida-
tion. This provision, if properly utilized, enables the owner or
investor to treat royalty profits derived from a lease conveying
the operating rights to another as capital gain." Section 631(c)
is one of many instances where Congress, to encourage certain
activity, accords long-term capital gain treatment to receipts
which would usually be ordinary income. The predecessor of §
631(c) came into the law in 1951, 8 years after enactment by
Congress of a parallel provision providing special capital gain
treatment for the sale of cut timber by the landowner.'8 Its
legislative history explains the reasons for its enactment. Oil
and gas had been flowing from the wells in abundance, provid-
ing cheap gasoline and fuel for the consumer and profits for
both operating and royalty interests. In contrast the coal
industry was sick. Not only was the nominal 10 percent deple-
tion for coal less than the allowance for oil and gas, but fre-
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331, 1221, 1231 [hereinafter cited as IRCI.
See Agria, Special Tax Treatment of Mineral Industries, in THE TAXATION OF
INCOME FROM CAPITAL (F.A. Harberger and M. Bailey eds. 1969).
" Technically, § 631(c) relief provides capital gain by treating the amount re-
ceived over the adjusted depletion base as profit from the sale included in § 1231.
Under § 1231, sales of property used in the taxpayer's business are treated as capital
gains and losses if the total gains from such property exceed total losses; otherwise the
loss is treated as an ordinary business loss. Section 1231, in defining "property used
in the trade or business," specifically includes coal with respect to which § 631(c)
applies. IRC § 1231(b)(2).
IN Ir. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 117(k)(2) (now IRC § 631(b)).
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quently depletion provided n'o help because the maximum was
limited to 50 percent of taxable income. Furthermore, many
long standing coal leases provided royalties in stated amounts
per ton rather than as a percentage of the value of coal taken
from the mine, thus preventing lessors from sharing in rising
prices.'"
The statutory requirements under § 631(c) for the special
tax favor to royalties of coal and iron ore2" are relatively clear
cut: (1) The taxpayer must be an "owner" of coal with an
economic interest in the mineral in place, (2) he must dispose
of this interest, while (3) at the same time retaining an "eco-
nomic interest" in the coal in place, and finally (4) he must
have held the coal for 6 months prior to disposing of his owner-
ship interest. The disposal or conveyance may be "under any
form of contract or agreement." '2' The 6 month holding period
requirement is easily complied with because the date of dis-
posal is deemed to be the date when actual mining is begun
rather than the date of the lease. The term "owner" is not
limited to the original landowner, but may include a successor
in interest such as a devisee, legatee, donee, or purchaser or a
shareholder receiving a corporation's assets upon liquidation.22
The benefits of § 631(c) extend even to a taxpayer in the
business of buying and selling coal leases in the ordinary course
of his business. 23 In keeping with the purpose of giving capital
, In the language of the contemporaneous committee report:
Most leases on coal properties are long-term and call for royalty payments
expressed in cents per ton. Therefore, the lessor does not receive the auto-
matic adjustment for price changes which occurs when a royalty is expressed
as a percentage of the value of the mineral extracted from the property.
Many of the existing coal leases are old and the royalty payment called for
under them is small.
H.R. REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1951).
- The provision for iron ore was added to the statute in 1954.
2, IRC § 631(c); Treas. Reg. 1.631-3(b)(5)(i); T. D. 6841, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 207.
22 Rev. Rul. 59-416, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 159. See Treas. Reg. 1.631-3(b)(4); Rev.
Rul. 55-621, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 277.
3 Treas. Reg. 1.631-3(a)(2) T.D. 6841, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 207:
In the case of such disposal, the provisions of § 1231 apply, and the coal...
shall be considered to be property used in the trade or business for the
taxable year in which it is considered to have been sold .. .regardless of
whether the coal or iron ore is property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
See the discussion in Coggins, Disposition of Coal Interests: Section 631(c), 29 TAx
LAWYER 95, 101 (1975).
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gains to owner-investors, not operators, however, the statute
specifically excludes the income realized "by any owner as a co-
adventurer, partner, or principal in the mining of such coal
.... 24 The owner entitled to § 631(c) treatment cannot in
addition deduct percentage depletion; capital gain under § 631
and percentage depletion are mutually exclusive.
Section 631(c) embraces within its benefits not only the
original owner of the coal, but also the lessee who complies with
its terms by securing an economic interest from the original
owner and, as sublessor, or even a sub-sublessor, leases to the
operating miner. A typical situation described in the regula-
tions assumes a landowner with underlying coal who leases to
a lessee, for a royalty of $1.00 per ton. The lessee in turn leases
to a mining company for $1.50 per ton. The disposition of coal
by the landowner to his lessee and by the lessee, as sublessor,
to the mining company both qualify for § 631(c) treatment.
The $1.00 royalty received by the landowner is capital gain; the
net profit received by the lessee, 50 cents per ton, is likewise
capital gain.25 Profits from sales made by the sublessee, the
mine operator, do not qualify for § 631(c) treatment; rather
they constitute ordinary income subject to depletion.
Standard form leases usually meet the statutory require-
ments, including the requirement that the lessor retain an eco-
nomic interest in the coal in place. The lease will convey to the
miner or operator an economic interest to which the lessor must
look for his royalties. A qualified economic interest may take
the form of royalties, advance royalties, minimum royalties, or
bonuses, provided the owner-lessor must look to the production
of the coal itself to satisfy the payments. Thus it is possible for
a landowner with underlying coal, or for a lessee of the land-
owner's coal rights, or even a sub-lessee, by contractual ar-
rangement with the operator, to enjoy some of the mining prof-
its at capital gain rates. The operator, while denied capital gain
treatment and although required to report his profits as ordi-
nary income, is nevertheless entitled to reduce the amount of
his income by his depletion allowance.
21 IRC § 631(c).
The lessee's net profit is computed by subtracting from the gross amount of
$1.50 received from the operator, his cost ("adjusted depletion basis") of $1.00 which
he must pay the owner.
1976]
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The special break which § 631(c) provides for the owner of
coal is a unique aspect not enjoyed by the owners of oil or other
minerals. The noncoal mineral owner must ordinarily make a
complete sale of his entire interest as a prerequisite to capital
gain treatment. For example, an oil and gas lease with royalties
retained does not qualify as a sale and the royalties retained
receive ordinary income treatment." For coal, however, Con-
gress has seen fit to favor the owner or lessee with special capi-
tal gain treatment for royalties received.
This special benefit for coal royalties is no easier to defend
than many of the other special tax provisions which stretch the
capital asset concept to cover special situations. The provision
might be justified by a slight twist to one of Louis Eisenstein's
three famous ideologies of taxation - ability to pay. Even
though coal operators were receiving more for their coal, the
royalties remained the same. Therefore, the lessors' "inability
to obtain larger royalties had to be compensated by the benefit
of lower taxes."27 As tax expenditures go, however, the cost is
relatively slight. The United States budget for fiscal 1976 esti-
mates the cost of the tax benefit to be about $5,000,000 for coal
and iron ore combined, about the same as in each of the two
previous fiscal years, with the lion's share of the benefit accru-
ing to corporations rather than to individuals.
2
1
B. Depletion
A deduction for exhaustion of minerals through extraction
from the earth began with the first income tax law under the
equitable principle that such exhaustion of taxpayer's invest-
ment should be restored to him by permitting a deduction from
profits over the lifetime of the mineral. As the deduction devel-
oped subsequently, however, it came to serve yet another pur-
pose-to accelerate the extraction and consumption of some
energy sources over others. The present statutory provision
states that in the case of mines, oil and gas wells, and other
2' The leading case is Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); cf. Freund v. United
States, 367 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1966)(the court will examine substance of transaction
to determine whether it is in reality a sale or a lease).
2. L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 51 (1961).
2 SPECIAL ANALYSES; BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
1976, (Special Analysis F) at 108.
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natural deposits, a taxpayer may deduct, in arriving at taxable
income, "a reasonable allowance for depletion and depreciation
of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions of each
case." While the depreciation deduction is designed to com-
pensate for the wearing out of equipment and other property
used in the taxpayer's business, depletion serves a similar pur-
pose in compensating for the exhaustion of the mineral itself.
The early income tax statutes limited the total deduction
to the taxpayer's cost of his investment in the mineral. This
cost depletion method was designed to restore the taxpayer's
cost through an annual deduction spaced over the extraction
period. Under this method the amount of deduction each year
was the cost per unit mined during the year.-" As an incentive
to encourage new exploration during World War I, Congress
permitted an annual deduction each year based on the value
of the mine or well at the time of discovery, or 30 days there-
after'.3 This discovery value method, however, was abandoned
in 1954.
In 1926 Congress introduced percentage depletion, a new
method for the petroleum industry, computed at 271/2 percent
of gross income (computed upon value at the mouth of the
well), but not in excess of 50 percent of the net income from
the property and not less than the amount of depletion allowa-
ble under the cost method.32 Percentage depletion was initially
allowed only for oil and gas. In 1932, however, it was extended
to other minerals with varying rates, but subject to the same
limitation of 50 percent of net income as applied to the petro-
leum industry.13 At this time the depletion rate for coal was set
at 5 percent; it was not until 1951 that the present rate of 10
IRC § 611.
Detailed examples of the computation are set out in Treas. Reg. 1.611-a(2)
(1960); see also P-H 1976 FED. TAXES, OIL & Gas 2036.4(2).
1' Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1056, §§ 214(a)(10) and 234(a)(9). Resumes
of the history of discovery of value depletion appear in Burke, Incentives to Develop
Natural Resources: Factors Affecting Industries Involved in Natural Resources
Exploitation; Oil and Gas; Hard Minerals; Timber, 33 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX., part
2, 1541, 1547 (1975)[hereinafter cited as Burke]; and in B. BITrKER AND L. STONE,
FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE Gl'r TAXATION 331-32 (1971).
12 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, § 204(c)(2). The 50 percent limitation
upon the maximum amount of percentage depletion is based upon the net income from
the property computed without the allowance for depletion.
-" Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 169, § 114(b)(4).
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percent came into the law.
The most important feature of percentage depletion is that
it is not limited to the taxpayer's cost. On the contrary, it is
based upon gross income or the value of production each year
and may thus rise with the market. In this way the deduction
often continues to reduce taxable profits long after the tax-
payer has recovered his cost. The deduction rises as income
rises, saving more taxes as profits rise and the taxpayer reaches
higher income tax brackets. It also eliminates the difficult
problem, encountered under the, cost method, of estimating the
total number of future recoverable units in the mineral deposit.
Undoubtedly the chief beneficiary of the controversial per-
centage depletion deduction has been the oil and gas industry.
The rate initially was 27/2 percent of gross income, or in the
absence of sale, an amount determined by the value of the oil
and gas at the mouth of the mine. The rate remained 272
percent until 1969 when it was reduced to 22 percent. 4 Al-
though percentage depletion has been abolished for large pro-
ducers by the Tax Reform Act of 1975,15 the allowance is re-
tained for operators presently producing under 2,000 barrels a
day, 1000 barrels a day by 1980. As a result, oil and gas ven-
tures will continue as tax shelters for wealthy individual inves-
tors, small corporations, and individual entrepreneurs.36
Percentage depletion is generally justified by the need to
provide an incentive for capital investment and to encourage
risk-taking and exploration for new reserves.37 The nation's de-
fense needs have also been cited as justification, even before
higher prices for foreign oil forced us to reexamine our depend-
" Section 501 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), amended § 613(b)(1) of the IRC. One reason, as stated by the Ways and Means
Committee report, was to create a more equitable distribution of the heavy tax burden
among all industries and taxpayers. Further, the benefits of the 27 V2 percent rate for
the industry had increased with the substantial rise in tax rates since its first enact-
ment in 1926; so that there was a need for a better balance than now exists between
the objectives of encouraging the discovery of new reserves and the revenue costs. H.R.
REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 289 (1969).
5 Tax Reform Act of 1975, H.R. 10612, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), § 501. No
change was made in existing rates for minerals other than oil and gas.
Tax lawyers should draw some profifable business from the reform since parts
of the Act are vague and no published studies were made by Congressional committees
to throw light on its intent. See FORBES, May 1, 1975, at 40.
37 See Burke supra note 31.
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ence upon foreign energy sources.38 It has been pointed out that
an abundant supply of energy is needed for economic growth
and to maintain a higher standard of living. 9 Critics of percen-
tage depletion point out, however, that it has failed in its objec-
tive to encourage exploration for new reserves, promoting in-
stead the exploitation and exhaustion of proven oil and gas
fields. The assured taxable income produced in an established
field alleviates all risk that the 50 percent limit on taxable
income may deprive the operator of any depletion allowance in
a given year, an event which happens all too frequently to
operators who seek to develop unknown fields." They also note
that the greatest benefits have gone to the producers with the
greatest profits and not to the marginal producers. To the ex-
tent that percentage depletion exceeds the taxpayer's cost
basis in his mineral deposit, it has been aptly described as:
"The special deduction for imaginary costs."4'
Another argument against percentage depletion is that it
has resulted in a misallocation of resources. In the case of pe-
troleum, for example, it resulted in rapid exhaustion of known
reserves. Instead of encouraging exploration, it has discouraged
geological and geophysical exploration in favor of easily drilled
new wells in proven fields where high profits assure a high
deduction. Furthermore, ideals of neutrality and equity in a
tax system are violated by special benefits to certain taxpayers.
The result has been higher taxes for all taxpayers as a group
and deterioration of taxpayer rmorality, a most undesirable
consequence in an income tax system based upon self-
assessment."
The same arguments in defense of percentage depletion for
petroleum have also been made for coal. When the 5 percent
allowance was first extended to coal in 1932 the announced
lId.
See Campbell, Percentage Depletion and Exploration and Development Costs,
2 COMPENDIUM 1041.
11 R. MANCKE, THE FAILURE OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY 85 (1974); Miller, Percentage
Depletion and the Development of Domestic Mineral Production 15 NATURAL RE-
souRcEs J. 241, 254-55 (1975).
4, The phrase is from the chapter heading for chapter 5 of Louis Eisenstein's
masterful work, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 123 (1961).
12 Agria, Special Tax Treatment of Mineral Industries in THE TAXATION OF INCOME
FROM CAPITAL 78 (A. Harberger and MY-Bailey eds. 1969). See also NATIONAL OBSERVER,
Jan. 17, 1976, at 1, 15.
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justification was that the coal industry was in desperate condi-
tion .43 Nineteen years later the raising of the maximum rate to
10 percent and the simultaneous extension of capital gain
treatment to coal royalties were thought to be needed to protect
the coal industry from the competitive forces of oil and gas."
Thus at the same time percentage depletion was used to stimu-
late the prosperous petroleum industry, it was also advocated
as necessary to save the ailing coal industry. Industry repre-
sentatives have correctly pointed out that in many years the
full benefit of the percentage limit is not actually enjoyed due
to the 50 percent of taxable income limitation. This tends to
reduce or eliminate the deduction. The oil and gas industry on
the other hand, more nearly averages the full statutory rate
because its taxable income from proven fields is usually
higher.45 Available estimates indicate that the average effective
percentage depletion actually allowed coal mines has approxi-
mated 4 to 5 percent although it might approach 6 percent or
better for a more prosperous year such as 1974.46 Coal industry
spokesmen consistently urge that the allowance should be 15
percent instead of the present 10 percent. After all, where
percentage depletion is still available for alternative sources of
power, uranium and oil and gas, the deduction is 22 percent.4
In evaluating the real benefit from depletion, the cutoff
point is very important. For oil and gas the percentage compu-
tation has always been on the gross value when drawn from the
ground at the well. The base, however, for computation of per-
centage depletion on coal, is the "gross income from mining,"
although that base has been enlarged by statutory amendment
to include the following post-extraction treatment processes:
"cleaning, breaking, sizing, dust-allaying, treating to prevent
freezing, and loading for shipment.14 Furthermore, for all hard
13 75 Cong. Rec. 10418-19 (1932).
" See H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1950); S. REP. No. 781, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1951).
" This is explained in a discussion of the economic effects of depletion, in Miller,
Percentage Depletion and the Level of Domestic Mineral Production, 15 NATURAl.
RESOURCES J. 241-55 (1975).
11 G. BRANNON, STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY 14 (1975); G. BRANNON, ENERGY
TAXES AND SUBSIDIES 33 (1974).
I? See Campbell, 2 COMPENDIUM 1049 supra note 6.
IRC §§ 613(b)(1)(A) and (B).
" IRC § 613(c)(4)(A). Note that § 613(a) states that the percentage rates are
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minerals "mining" is now defined to include transportation not
in excess of 50 miles from the point of extraction to the plant
where the treatment processes are applied." Thus considerable
value is added to the coal after it is removed from the ground,
resulting in a higher dollar amount of depletion. The allowance
of depletion on the limited transportation and enumerated
treatment processes does not, however, include value added by
manufacturing processes performed by an integrated miner-
manufacturer. An example of such is the generating of coal into
electricity by a utility. Nor would it apply to the process by
which coking coal is produced for use in the manufacture of
steel. Clearly the value added to coal in plants engaged in
liquefaction or gasification of coal is beyond the cutoff point,
although some suggestion has been made that the depletion tax
advantage should be extended to these processes also."' The
same argument can be made if an efficient and pollution-free
method of burning coal is developed such as the "fluidized
combustion" process developed in England.
2
Percentage depletion for the mineral industry as a whole
has been estimated to cost the public more than $3 billion a
year,53 but this cost is not broken down between coal and other
minerals. One source has described the cost of the provisions
for percentage depletion and the expense of development out-
lays affecting coal as "insignificant" when compared to the
total.54
C. Treatment of Expenditures
Coal mining has been described as a capital intensive in-
dustry; underground mines especially require large capital in-
vestment before profitable production is reached. Naturally,
applied to the "gross income from the property" and that § 613(c)(1) states that the
latter term means gross income from mining (for minerals other than oil and natural
gas).
° IRC § 613(c)(2).
For a more complete discussion see the Louisville Courier-Journal, April 10,
1976, at 1, sec. B. A recent meeting was held at the Kentucky Center for Energy
Research with British coal authorities preparatory to a cost-benefit analysis of the
feasibility of using the newly developed British process in this country.
11 See P-H 1976 FED. TAxEs, OIL & Gas 2034.
53 Special Analysis F. supra, note 28, at 10.
11 G. BRANNON, ENERGY TAXEs AND SuBsIoEs 34 (1974).
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the tax treatment of such capital outlays is a vital factor in an
operator's profitable operations. May a given expense be de-
ducted from current income or should it instead be capitalized
and depreciated over the useful life of the asset? If the tax
deduction must take the form of depreciation, what methods
and rates of depreciation are allowed? What kinds of expendi-
ture benefit by a special tax favor in the form of a fast write-
off or amortization?
1. Exploration and Development Expenses
For tax purposes exploration expenses are those paid or
incurred for the purpose of "ascertaining the existence, loca-
tion, extent or quality" of the coal deposit prior to the begin-
ning of the development of the mine. 5 Development expenses,
incurred to make the coal accessible to extraction, are "all
expenditures . . . for the development of a mine . . . paid or
incurred after the existence of ores or minerals in commercially
marketable quantities has been disclosed."5 In accounting and
tax theory, both exploration and development expenditures are
capital outlays, not part of the cost of current operations but
attributable to future operations. Yet similar favorable income
tax treatment is accorded to both types of expenditures by
allowing the coal operator either to deduct against current in-
come or to capitalize and deduct the expenditure through am-
ortization from profits as the coal is mined."
The present tax treatment of development expenses, and
a somewhat more limited deduction for exploration expenses,
first came into the income tax law in 1951.11 Contemporary
legislative committee reports point to the reason for the legisla-
tion: a need to encourage increased exploration and develop-
ment of mineral deposits by the smaller operators.59 Denial of
a current tax deduction for development expenditures was
viewed as a serious obstacle to expansion of the mining indus-
try, especially acute at this time because of the Korean War
5 IRC § 617; Treas. Regs. 1.617-1(a).
1 IRC § 616(a); Treas. Regs. 1.616-1(a).
IRC §§ 616, 617.
' See Burke, supra, note 31; INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 23 et seq.
s' S. REP. No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1951).
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effort. 0 The 1951 provision for deducting development expen-
ses has remained substantially unchanged. The taxpayer
makes an annual election with respect to each separate mine
or mineral property to deduct such expenses currently or to
capitalize and spread the deduction over the period when the
minerals benefited by such expenses are extracted and sold."
Today, the operator is allowed to deduct exploration ex-
penditures from operations without any monetary limit except
for operations outside the United States for which the statute
retains a total limit of $400,000 previously applicable to all
operations. However, a price exacted by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 for allowing the unlimited deduction is that all such
expenses deducted after January 1, 1970 are subjected to a new
recapture rule as soon as there is production from the mine.
Under this recapture taxpayers must either include as gross
income in the first year at the mine's commercial production
the entire amount of exploration expense previously deducted,
or forego any depletion allowance until the allowable depletion
in subsequent years has completely offset the previously de-
ducted exploration expense.62 Although this election is made
annually, a taxpayer who elects to include the previously de-
ducted amounts in the first productive year's income must
adhere to his election with respect to all mines which reach the
productive stage at any time during that year."
2. Depreciation
Depreciation is the form of business expense deduction for
capital outlays and permanent additions or improvements
which will last beyond the year of expenditure. The deduction
is spread over the useful life of the property to the taxpayer,
as distinguished from repairs and other annual expenditures
which are deductible in the year incurred. Since application of
depreciation principles to coal mining is the same as for any
other business, no special discussion is required.64
'0 H.R. REP. No. 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 30-1 (1951); see also, Burke, note 31 supra.
' IRC § 616(a); Treas. Reg. 1.616-1(a); P-H 1976 FED. TAXES, OIL AND GAS 1
2036.3; Wright, Tax Practice in the Mining Industry, J. OF REAL ESTATE TAXATION 441
(1975).
62 IRC § 617(b); Treas. Reg. 1.617-3(a).
63 Id.
1' Accelerated methods may be used for mining machinery and equipment. Pro-
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3. Special Provisions for Rapid Write-offs
The federal income tax statute contains a number of provi-
sions whereby taxpayers are permitted by Congressional lar-
gesse to elect a modification of their usual depreciation rates
by either a current deduction or a more rapid write-off of out-
lays to purchase or improve certain business property. For coal
the two most important elections concern the amortization of
the cost of qualified air and water pollution control equipment
and coal mining safety equipment.65 Both are taken over a 60
month period instead of the usual depreciable life of the prop-
erty. Both provisions were enacted by the Tax Reform Act of
1969, and the effects and technical requirements for qualifying
each are closely parallel. Section 169, pertaining to the amorti-
zation of pollution control equipment, requires that the ex-
penditure be for a "certified pollution control facility," defined
as a "new identifiable treatment facility" "to abate or control
water or atmospheric pollution or contamination by removing,
altering, storing, or disposing of pollutants, contaminants,
wastes, or heat."" Federal certifying agencies, the Department
of Interior for water pollution and the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare for air pollution, must certify to the
IRS that the facility complies with applicable federal environ-
mental control regulations and furthers policies of federal-state
cooperation under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.1
7
This faster-than-normal depreciation deduction is one of
the few income tax provisions focusing upon environmental
rather than energy needs. The deduction becomes increasingly
more important to the coal operator as he buys or constructs
new equipment to meet the higher standards of pollution con-
trol imposed by federal and state agencies. Furthermore, it
may even provide operators with some incentive to invest in
pollution control equipment beyond the minimum standards
set by regulatory agencies.
In electing these special write-offs, however, an astute coal
mulgation of the optional Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) regulations permits an
operator to shorten guideline estimates of useful life by 20 percent and thus increase
the annual deduction.
IRC §§ 169, 187.
IRC § 169(d)(i).
IRC § 169(d)(i)(B).
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operator should not overlook arithmetic. The 60 month amorti-
zation is computed on a straight line basis in lieu of any depre-
ciation, including additional first year depreciation and op-
tional accelerated methods. The election also precludes taking
investment credit on that part of the cost of the improvements
for which the 60 month write-off is applicable. 8 In many cases,
if not most, the benefits otherwise obtainable such as the in-
vestment credit against the tax itself, plus normal depreciation
deductions will exceed the benefits from choosing the fast
write-off.
Discussion of rapid write-offs requires mention of one sec-
tion of the current version of the "Energy Conservation and
Conversion Act of 1975" which passed the House of Represent-
atives. This provision permits taxpayers to elect a 60 month
amortization of "qualified energy use property," which is de-
fined to include coal processing equipment and coal slurry
pipelines as well as certain waste equipment and shale oil con-
version equipment. Coal processing equipment is defined as
any depreciable machinery or equipment for processing coal
into a liquid or gaseous state. Interestingly enough, the first
version of this legislation (which did not pass the House) con-
tained a much broader 60 month write-off for the coal industry,
encompassing all depreciable machinery or equipment used in
any phase of mining-equipment used for example, to reach,
extract, and bring the coal to the mouth of the mine, to restore
the overburden, or otherwise restore the property to a long-
term stable condition. 0 As previously noted, the coal industry
already enjoys the general depreciation rates applicable to
equipment, and it is therefore questionable whether the pro-
posed rapid write-off is needed.
11 IRC § 48(a)(8); P-H 1976 FED. TAX HANDBOOK 2045, 2050(b). Several commen-
tators evaluating the efficacy of § 169 consider that it fails to provide the "significant
economic incentive needed for the acquisition of pollution control facilities," Millett,
Pollution and the Federal Revenue Code, 8 WAKE FOREST L. R. 535, 548 (1972); see
also, McDaniel & Kaplinshy, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat
Air and Water Pollution, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rev. 351 (1971); Reitze & Reitze,
Tax Incentives Don't Stop Pollution, 57 A.B.A.J. 127 (1971); Comment, Tax Incentives
to Combat Pollution, 50 J. URBAN L. 273 (1972).
11 H.R. 6860, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 521 (1975); see H.R. REP. No. 94-221, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
11 H.R. 5005, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 721 (1975).
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4. Investment credit
Coal operators, whether doing business as corporations,
partnerships or sole proprietors, may obtain a tax benefit in the
form of a credit against the tax itself by purchasing depreciable
business property and using it in mining. The investment
credit, a stimulus to investment in business property, was dis-
continued as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, but was
restored in 1971 and increased in 1975.71 Any new qualified
property acquired and placed in service during the tax year
now entitles the taxpayer to a credit not in excess of 10 percent
of the property's cost depending upon the kind of property, but
subject to a dollar limitation of $100,000 for taxpayers filing a
joint return in 1975 and 1976.72 Industry representatives gener-
ally feel that even greater inducements to invest in coal should
be provided as part of our national energy policy.
D. A Perspective on Coal and Federal Taxes
The federal income tax provisions discussed so far are the
major taxes affecting the coal industry, and their impact has
been great. These provisions are all intended to provide a tax
incentive to encourage investment. While most of them relate
to energy goals, the rapid write-off of pollution control equip-
ment relates primarily to environmental quality. Although it
would be difficult to assess accurately the extent of tax favors
enjoyed by coal compared with oil and gas, to what parties the
benefits accrue, or their merits as compared with direct subsi-
dies or expenditures, a few opinions may nevertheless be ven-
tured.
Historically, income tax incentives have been more favora-
71 IRC §§ 38, 46. The maximum percentage is derived when the equipment has a
useful life of 7 years or more. The provisions for qualification are technical and will
not be discussed here.
72 IRC § 48(a)(1).
7 For example, see remarks of Rolla D. Campbell, General Counsel, Island Creek
Coal Company, before the House Ways & Means Committee, 2 COMPENDIUM 1041 at
1050, "we must have sufficient capital, knowhow, and personnel to enable us to make
the vast expansion of plant capacity which inevitably will be required. This productive
capacity cannot be attained if the tax climate makes investment in coal mining unat-
tractive." Similar comments are legion. E.g., statement by E.B. Leienring, Jr., Chair-
man, Tax Committee, National Coal Association, 1975 PANEL DISCUSSION, supra note
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ble to the petroleum industry than the coal industry; since 1975
when percentage depletion was eliminated for the larger oil and
gas operations, the benefits have been more nearly equal. This
tilt is evidenced in the fact that petroleum exploration and
production declined during 1975 while coal production in-
creased. Economists who have attempted to estimate the total
impact of tax benefits upon investment in coal have-concluded
that the combination of benefits approximates a 50 percent
investment tax credit, compared with the present 10 percent
investment credit for industry as a whole. 4 There is considera-
ble difficulty with respect to the degree of benefit to different
persons or groups from these tax reductions, however. Experts
recognize the difficulty in determining the proportion of sub-
sidy enjoyed by the mineral operator as compared with the
benefit passed on to the public in the form of lower prices, the
employees through higher wages, or the landowner or other
mineral owner through increased royalties. One economist has
estimated that the combined income tax figures for all the
mining industries when viewed together are spread approxi-
mately 50 percent to lower prices, 40 percent to royalties for
owners of mineral industries, and 10 percent to increased oper-
ators' profits. 5
An unanswered question is the advantage of tax incen-
tives compared with direct expenditures. Public interest tax
groups view tax subsidies designed to influence specific busi-
ness and personal decisions as generally undesirable. "Direct
government expenditures, which are subject to periodic ac-
counting and review, are almost always a less expensive way of
attaining public goals than are tax subsidies."" Furthermore,
the use of incentives to achieve economic goals has been at-
tacked on grounds of erosion of the tax base in favor of special
" See Agria, Special Tax Treatment of Mineral Industries in THE TAXATION OF
INCOME FROM CAPITAL 77 (N. Harberger and M. Bailey eds. 1969). The estimates were
made for both coal, oil and gas, but were made prior to the elimination of percentage
depletion for large producers in 1975. See also G. BRANNON, STUoIES IN ENERcGY TAX
POLICY (1975).
See Agria supra note 74.
; The quotation is from a brochure published by Taxation with Representation,
a group of tax experts representing the public interest, located at 2369 N. Taylor St.,
Arlington, Va. 22207.
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groups and interests and possible misallocation of resources. 7
A small chapter in the debate over the use of tax incentives
instead of direct subsidies to achieve desirable objectives is
concerned with pollution control bonds. The statutory provi-
sion excepting interest on state and municipal bonds from fed-
eral income tax was recently extended to include the interest
on certain bonds issued by utilities to raise money for pollution
control. Though easily overlooked in discussion of tax policy,
this exemption has a significant effect upon the volume of in-
vestment dollars channeled in control equipment.7 In 1974 it
was estimated that pollution control bonds alone accounted for
15 percent of total funds used for this purpose. 9 It is no wonder
that interest rates rose and states and municipalities had diffi-
culty borrowing for essential governmental functions. Nor is it
surprising that the Treasury and the Municipal Finance Offi-
cers Association have joined in viewing with alarm any further
proliferation of pollution control issues and in calling for an end
to the exemption." This relatively less important tax provision
is one example of the difficulty with taxes as a policy tool.
Incentives to further special objectives and aid special groups
can have unintended effects.
Despite the growing swell of opinion that the federal in-
come tax system should be neutral to better serve its primary
objective of raising revenue outlined earlier in this article, tax
laws continue to be used to exert economic pressure to accom-
plish goals deemed worthy. One prime example is the latest
version of the Ullman bill, the "Energy Conservation and Con-
version Act of 1975. " 81 The Act now contains a wide variety of
tax mechanisms designed to encourage conservation and also
11 See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); Agria, supra note 74; L. EISEN-
STEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961).
11 IRC § 103. Combined with the growth of investment in exempt industrial
development bonds before Congress enacted restrictions limiting their use in 1968,
there has been rapid growth in money invested in exempt bonds.
79 See Secretary Simon's testimony in PUBLIC HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS ON TAX REFORM, H.R. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. part 1, at 14 (1975).
" "The Municipal Finance Officers Association views the proliferation of pollu-
tion control issues as a prime factor [in driving up interests rates on tax exempt
bonds] and has called for repeal or restriction of such financing. The [Department
of] Treasury shares that judgment." Id.
-1 H.R. 6860, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which recently passed the House of
Representatives was subjected to numerous amendments in the Senate.
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to allocate resources to production and consumption of desired
energy sources. For example, an investment tax credit is pro-
posed for home insulation;82 solar energy equipment or machi-
nery placed in service; 83 and recycling of glass, paper, textiles
and metal.84 In addition the act would eliminate the invest-
ment credit currently allowed for electric generating facilities
fueled by petroleum and for heating and air conditioning
units.86
The bill also contains numerous excise tax modifications
designed to encourage conservation including an excise tax on
gasoline with future hikes dependent upon whether consump-
tion is held to 1973 levels, a hike in the tax on automobiles with
low fuel efficiency, and a repeal of the excise tax on buses in
intercity transportation.87 There is also the rapid amortization
of "qualified energy use property," including coal processing
equipment and coal slurry pipelines.
The tax incentives proposed by the Ullman bill have not
gone without criticism. It is said that these tax incentives, like
other preferences, erode the tax base, constitute "backdoor
spending" not subject to the safeguards of appropriations and
budget procedures, benefit the well-to-do taxpayers more than
the poor who are unable to incur expenditures for credit entitle-
ment, and reward individuals through the tax system for what
they probably would have done anyway as a result of the opera-
tion of the price system."9 All in all the numerous preferences
"would prove costly and ineffective in trying to achieve energy
savings."" The Ullman bill, which includes higher taxes on
imported oil, is estimated to produce a net increase in revenues
of $8.7 billion by 1980, of which about $5 billion will go into an
11 Id. Section 331 would allow an investment credit equal to 30 percent on quali-
fied insulation expenditures to the extent that such expenditures do not exceed $500.
,1 Id. Section 332 would place a maximum credit of 40 percent of the first $1000
spent on qualified solar energy expenditures and 20 percent on the excess over $1000
but not to exceed $2,000.
11 Id. § 533(3)(1).
Id. § 532(a), amending IRC § 48.
Id. § 531(b), amending IRC § 48(a)(1)(A).
Id. §§ 211, 311, 321.
Id. § 521.
H.R. REP. No. 94-221, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 224-26 (views of Reps. Sam M.
Biggons, Abner K. Mikva, James C. Corman, and Pete Stark) (1975).
, Id. at 224..
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Energy Conservation and Conversion Trust Fund.,'
Some of the Ullman proposals, such as the excises on gaso-
line and the denial of investment credit for heating and air
conditioning units, are intended to deter undesirable activity
rather than encourage desired activity. These provisions could
evoke the much debated question of the merits of control
through taxation as compared with direct control through gov-
ernment regulation.
III. STATE TAXATION
The coal industry is taxed by the states chiefly through
income, property, .and severance taxes. While state income
taxes are set at lesser rates, they closely parallel the federal
model in policy effects, and, therefore, are not discussed in this
article. In addition neither property nor ad valorem taxes on
coal interests will be discussed at any length. It should, how-
ever, be noted that most states have had extreme difficulty in
reaching a fair system of assessment and collection. In the
counties there is both the political problem of fair assessment
by locally elected assessors who often are beholden to the in-
dustry, and there are unusually difficult valuation problems as
well. Even where exploration has revealed the quantity and
quality of coal seams, its 'accessibility must be evaluated. The
coal industry points out that coal assessment cannot be based
solely upon its value in the ground without also taking into
account the cost and feasibility of commercially profitable
mining operations at the particular site.92 These difficulties
with property taxation of coal led many states to enact a kind
of excise tax, known as a severance tax, on the value of the
mineral upon extraction.
A. Severance Taxes
A severance tax is an excise tax on the production of coal
or other minerals and has been broadly defined "as a levy
, H.R. REP. No. 94-221, supra note 88, at 21, 54.
92 See Brightwell, Ad Valorem Taxation of Mining Properties, 15 RoCKY MT. M.L.
INsT. 281 (1969). Kentucky recently enacted a law taxing interests in unmined coal.
Ky. Acts 167 (1976) amending Ky. REV. STAT. § 132.200 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KRS].
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assessed at flat or graduated rates by a government on the
privilege, process, or act of commercially severing or extracting
natural resources . . . and measured by the physical amount
or the gross or net value of the natural resources produced or
sold."93 The primary justification made for severance taxation
is the raising of revenue. Another supporting rationale is that
severance taxes represent a claim by the state to a part of the
value of its underground wealth lost by mining, and, to a lesser
degree, the taxes are justified as substitutes for property taxes
where the taxable property is minerals. 4 Severance taxes dif-
fer, however, from ad valorem taxation in that the former tax
is levied not upon the value of the mineral deposit in the
ground but only upon its value when extracted. Severance
taxes also differ considerably from income taxes in that the tax
base of the former is on total production while the latter is on
profit. Although a severance tax at the federal level has been
proposed, such taxes now are exclusively imposed by the var-
ious states. 5 One important characteristic, from the viewpoint
of exporting states, is that the burden of the tax is borne by
consumers outside the state in the form of additional cost
passed on by the coal operator.
In recent years the incidence of severance taxes by state
governments has rapidly increased. These taxes vary widely in
form and in each state the rate is different; however in every
case the rate is nominal in comparison to the value of the coal
extracted. Instead of a progressive rate varying with the
amount extracted, the general rule is to impose a flat rate per
ton of material mined. 6
11 Lockner, The Economic Effect of the Severance Tax on Decisions of the Mining
Firm, 4 NATURAL RESoURcES J. 468, 469 (1965).
91 See generally STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY (G. Brannon ed. 1974).
15 Hearings on Surface Mining Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and
Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 92-13, pt. 1, at 492 (1971).
9 ALA. CODE tit. 51 § 431(15) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (13'/2 cents per ton of coal); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 84-2102 (1947) (2 cents per ton); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-23-101
(1973)(.7 cents per ton); KRS § 143.020(1971)(4 percent of the gross value); LA. REV.
STAT. § 47:633(13)(1970)(10 cents per ton); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-1314 (Cum.
Supp. 1975)(a progressive tax correlated to the heating quality of the coal and differen-
tiating between surface and underground mining); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-61-01 (Supp.
1975)(50 cents per ton with increases dependent upon increases in the U.S. Dept. of
Labor's wholesale price index for commodities); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 10-39-24
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Although severance taxes are designed primarily for the
raising of revenue, they can be a very flexible tax which can be
utilized for nonrevenue purposes. 7 Even the public interest tax
groups which deplore the use of tax subsidies to influence spe-
cific business decisions are likely to recommend the use of tax
sanctions in the form of severance or other user and effluent
taxes. The reason for this is simple. Because of damage done
to the environment, they believe there is need to bring social
and private costs into closer correspondence and see this tax as
a method of accomplishing this purpose. It is analogous to the
fabled tax on bachelors, where collections were earmarked for
children born out of wedlock; the underlying tax policy was
that the parties causing the problem should compensate so-
ciety for some of the damage. Increased severance tax rates are
also urged to provide revenue to repair damage caused by ac-
cess roads, to fund reclamation, and to repair or rebuild public
roads damages by coal trucks.
An example of the use of the severance tax to achieve
policy objectives can be found in proposals that Congress enact
a severance tax on a national level, perhaps with a higher rate
imposed on coal extracted by stripping than by deep mining.
One original proposal developed would establish a severance
tax progressively correlated to the degree of slope on which
strip mining is conducted.
It is a general rule that as the degree of slope on which
mining operations occur increases, the environmental damage
increases." A progressive severance tax corresponding to the
(Interim Supp. 1975)(4 percent of net profits); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5902 (Cum.
Supp. 1975)(20 cents per ton); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-227.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975)(.4
percent-.2 percent with the expiration of the tax after a total of $120 million dollars
have been collected).
"7 Kentucky has recently provided several methods to return funds gained from
the severance tax to the coal producing counties. Ky. H.R. 674, amending KRS §
42.330 (coal severance economic aid fund), and KRS § 42.350 (area development fund),
and KRS § 177.960 (energy road fund). Although the use of the severance tax may be
inefficient to repair the damage caused by the mining and transportation of coal, it is
one way to compensate the coal producing counties for their loss.
11 Kentucky, as do most mining states, prohibits mining above a certain degree
of slope; 402 Ky. ADM. REG. 1:030 § 2(2)(b) prohibits contour mining except for auger
mining above a slope of 27 degrees. See Hearings on the Regulation of Strip Mining
Before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-96, at 157 (1971).
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degree of slope would provide an incentive for coal operators to
extract coal that underlies less steep slopes, thus reducing envi-
ronmental damage and compensating the public for the envi-
ronmental damage caused by surface mining on steep hillsides.
Although it is still undetermined whether a tax directly propor-
tionate to increases in slope would be appropriate or whether
a progressive rate that would increase at a greater rate with the
increase in slope would best compensate the public for the
additional disruption of the environment, such a tax might be
an appropriate use of a tax as a policy tool."
IV. CONCLUSION
For many years the primary goal of energy tax policy was
to encourage the development of petroleum and natural gas-a
policy reflected by the depletion allowance and the deduction
for intangible drilling and development expenses. It is now
recognized, however, that oil and natural gas reserves will be
exhausted despite new discoveries long before the known coal
deposits, forecasted to last several hundred years, are seriously
depleted. In recognition of this inevitable development, and to
relieve America's dependence on foreign energy sources, tax
policies affecting coal are being modified to boost coal produc-
tion and consumption. The previously developed statutory
capital gain accorded coal royalties, the evolution of the deple-
tion allowance for coal, the tax treatment of exploration and
development expenses, and the tax credit and depletion deduc-
tion for investments in the coal industry support this new
objective. In addition, the rapid write-off of pollution control
equipment and the state severance tax can be used to further
protection of the environment.
In the past, however, taxation designed to provide eco-
nomic incentives has resulted in misallocation of resources.
Recent governmental policy has been to keep the price of oil
high enough to encourage investment in coal and coal conver-
sion plants. If, however, it should become cheaper to produce
electricity from coal than from nuclear plants, 0 the imposition
" See, e.g., Binder, A Novel Approach to Reasonable Regulation of Strip Mining,
34 U. Pirr. L. REV. 339 (1973).
"I See B. COMMONER, THE POVERTY OF POWER (1976). Commoner argues that gov-
ernment and industry policy with primary emphasis upon profits has produced the
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of a national tax on coal in order to protect government-
sponsored investment in nuclear energy would be a mistake. A
neutral tax system with direct expenditures for activity
deemed desirable would be the preferable alternative.
wrong kinds of energy. The neglect of solar energy and emphasis upon oil and the
development of nuclear energy is energy wasteful since, for example, approximately
90 percent of the energy potential of oil is wasted when it is converted to use in home
heating or automobile fuel. The same argument is applied to the development of coal
liquefaction plants, in which 1/3 of the coal energy is wasted to produce fuel that is
itself inefficient. See also Commoner, Energy, appearing in three installments in THE
NEW YORKER, Feb. 2, 1976 at 38, Feb. 9, 1976 at 38, Feb. 16, 1976 at 64.
